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DOES THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY HAVE A FATAL
ATTRACTION FOR HOSTILE TAKEOVERS? A
COMPARISON OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S
PROPOSED DIRECTIVE ON TAKEOVER BIDS AND THE
UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE
I. INTRODUCTION
Financial battles for control of public corporations generate controversy
because the outcome of a takeover bid affects widespread and divergent
interests.' Mergers and acquisitions alter the immediate financial interests
of the offeror2 as well as those of the target corporation's3 shareholders,
management, employees, enterprise-dependent local economies,4 and, ulti-
mately, the national economy. 5 Because the financial stakes of a takeover
are so high, each of the parties involved in a takeover attempt has a strong
incentive to develop strategies or responses to the bid that increase its ability
to control the outcome of the contest.
6
1. See I M. LIPToN & E. STEINBERGER, TAxcovExs & FREaznouTs § 1.01 (rev. 1989).
A takeover occurs when a party (offeror) attempts to acquire control of a company (target
company) through the purchase of some or all of the target company's outstanding shares.
1d. Typically, the offeror makes an offer directly to the target's shareholders for the purchase
of the target's shares at a substantial premium over the market price. Id. § 1.03. This process
by the offeror is commonly known as mounting a tender offer. Id.
2. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (defining "offeror").
3. See supra note I and accompanying text (defining "target company").
4. See Bebel & Vert, State Takeover Laws, Insider Trading, and the Interplay Between
the Two: A New Perspective, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 1001, 1008 (1989) (noting that hostile
takeovers result in job losses in state where target company operates); Coffee, Shareholders
Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 70-73 (1986)
(explaining that states often absorb costs of job losses and tax revenue declines that follow
takeover); Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L.
REv. 1, 25-26 (1987) (concluding that hostile takeovers lead to job losses and disrupt established
economic relationships between target company and local community); Macey, State Anti-
Takeover Legislation and the National Economy, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 467, 478-79 (conceding
that hostile takeovers often lead to transfer of target's employees from one plant or state to
another location). The financial effects of takeovers are more pronounced following a "bust-
up" acquisition, in which the acquirer quickly moves to sell off portions of the target company's
assets to repay the debt the acquirer assumed in purchasing the target's shares. See 1 M.
LnProN & E. STmmaERGR, supra note 1, § 1.0511] (defining "bust-up" mergers).
5. See Bebel & Vert, supra note 4, at 1006 (explaining that 1980s witnessed largest wave
of mergers, many on hostile basis, in United States history); Lipton, supra note 4, at 20-23
(emphasizing dramatic increase in use of debt in takeovers and resulting concern for health of
national economy); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101,
104-05 (1979) (noting that threat of disruption to national economy should be of paramount
concern); Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment of
Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DuIE L.J. 173, 173 (contending that disruptions caused
by takeovers vary directly with size of target).
6. 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINDERGER, supra note 1, § 1.01.
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In the United States, offerors initially made tender offers7 on short
notice and for limited time periods in an attempt to coerce target share-
holders to tender their holdings without a full evaluation of the offer's
merits." Target company managements responded by creating numerous
defensive measures to block or delay the offeror's ability to complete the
takeover. 9 Beginning in 1968, federal and state legislators in the United
States intervened and enacted statutes governing takeover bids in an attempt
to protect target shareholders from abusive takeover practices.' 0
Under the presumption that shareholders of the target company should
determine the outcome of a bid, federal and state legislators sought to
ensure a balance of power between the offeror and target management."
The legislators, however, were undecided whether takeovers normally would
yield positive economic benefits.' 2 Thus, federal regulation of takeovers
expressed a generally free market philosophy concentrating on providing
target shareholders with adequate financial disclosure and sufficient time to
review the offer. 3
States soon realized that the federal government's neutral policy on
tender offers did not attempt to restrict the offeror's rationale for a bid
7. See id. § 1.0311] (explaining that tender offers are more effective than proxy battles
because offeror can present bid directly to shareholders); 3B H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECuRrriES
A FEDERAL CoR'oRATE LAw § 13.24 (rev. 1989) (defining "tender offer); infra note 126
and accompanying text (same).
8. See 3B H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 7, § 13.28[2] (reviewing preregulation period
objectives of offeror in tender offer).
9. See id. (outlining target managements' responsive actions to block unwanted tender
offers); 1 M. LnTON & E. STEnBERGER, supra note 1, § 6.03 (outlining introduction of
defensive measures such as "poison pills," "golden parachutes," "lock-up" options, and
"Pac-Man" defenses by target management to thwart takeover bids).
10. See 3B H. BLoomENTHAL, supra note 7, § 13.28 (reviewing reasons for federal
legislation regarding takeovers); 1 M. LProN & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 1, § 5,0211]
(reviewing reasons for state legislation regarding takeovers).
11. See Johnson & Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1862, 1897-
99 (1989) (contending that in late 1960s both federal and state legislators took for granted
assumption that state's primary role was to protect individual shareholder autonomy in deciding
outcome of takeover bid).
12. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 11, at 1891-97 (explaining that Williams Act is
neutral and is not an endorsement by federal legislators of takeovers); Karmel, The Duty of
Directors to Non-Shareholder Constituencies in Control Transactions-A Comparison of U.S.
and U.K. Law, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 61, 69 n.46 (1990) (noting that federal legislators
were uncertain over merits of takeovers in 1960s and remain so); infra note 94 and accom-
panying text (discussing reasons why some federal and state legislators believed takeovers could
reinvigorate United States' industrial base).
13. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 11, at 1893-97 (noting that Congressional intent
in enacting federal takeover laws was to provide target company shareholders with sufficient
disclosure and procedural protections in face of tender offer). Johnson and Millon contend
that commentators who attempt to find a pro-takeover policy in federal regulations are
misreading the Williams Act's objectives. Id. at 1896-97. On the contrary, Johnson's and
Millon's view is that the Williams Act adopted a policy of neutrality toward takeover activity
as long as the offeror complied with all of the target shareholders' procedural protections. Id.
at 1895-96.
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and, therefore, could result in the takeover of resident corporations by
speculative offerors more interested in short-term financial gains than in
the long-term health of the target corporation. 14 To avoid disruption of
local economies, states in the 1980s began to enact various types of stringent
antitakeover statutes that effectively tipped the balance of interests in favor
of target management. 5 Congress has refused to preempt the states' legis-
lation.' 6 As a result, no consensus exists between federal and state author-
ities, or even among state authorities on what interests are paramount in a
takeover bid or what methods best regulate the competing interests.
7
As federal and state regulatory agencies' experience with takeovers in
the United States has grown, fundamental changes in the agencies' regulatory
philosophies have led to the decentralization of takeover controls from the
federal level to the state level.' In addition, regulatory goals have shifted
toward an emphasis on collective shareholder welfare rather than protection
of an individual shareholder's right to receive and to decide a tender offer.' 9
Finally, there is a trend toward active state discouragement of hostile
takeover bids.2
Similar to the United States, other countries are starting to address the
fundamental questions of whether and how to control the various interests
involved in a takeover bid. Traditionally, most corporate takeovers occur
in the United States and the United Kingdom. 2' Corporate takeovers are
common in the United States and the United Kingdom because these
countries have highly sophisticated and well-developed capital markets that
can provide an offeror with the funds necessary to launch and complete a
takeover, and have no real or practical restrictions on share transfers?22
14. See Buxbaum, The Threatened Constitutionalization of the Internal Affairs Doctrine
in Corporation Law, 75 CALF. L. R-v. 29, 32 (1987) (noting that states enacted statutes to
protect local interests because states found federal regulations ineffective).
15. See Kozyris, Some Observations on State Regulation of Multistate Takeovers-
Controlling Choice of Law Through the Commerce Clause, 14 DEL. J. Cosu. L. 499, 503
(1989) (contending that state legislation controls takeover activity in United States); infra notes
135-43 and accompanying text (discussing various methods that states have used to protect
local interests from takeover disruption).
16. See infra notes 161-62 and accompanying text (explaining that Congress has not
attempted to pass legislation that would preempt state antitakeover statutes).
17. See infra notes 129-43 & 149 and accompanying text (discussing different approaches
that federal and state takeover statutes use and different interests that such statutes protect).
18. See infra notes 157-62 and accompanying text (reviewing effect of state antitakeover
statutes in shifting control over success of takeover bid from federal to state level).
19. See infra notes 164-69 and accompanying text (outlining shift from shareholder
autonomy to shareholder protection against coercive offers).
20. See infra notes 171-78 and accompanying text (reviewing shift from original neutrality
toward takeovers to active discrimination against "unfriendly" transactions by state antitak-
cover statutes).
21. See 3C H. BLOOmNTEL, SEcuRms AND FEDERAL CoRPoRATE LAw § 15.05 (rev.
1989) (reviewing activity and size of major national stock markets worldwide).
22. Id.; see also Basaldda, Towards the Harmonization of EC Member States' Regulations
on Takeover Bids: The Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law, 9 Nw.
1990]
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Recently, many other countries have begun to deregulate their capital
markets. 2 Deregulation is especially prevalent in the Member States of the
European Economic Community (the Community).24 As part of the Com-
munity's attempt to harmonize corporate law among its Member States
prior to 1993,25 the European Commission (the Commission)26 has introduced
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 487, 492 (1989) (commenting that large number of takeovers in United
Kingdom stem from open and developed nature of United Kingdom's capital market); In the
Balance: A Survey of Europe's Capital Markets, Economist, Dec. 16, 1989, at 10, col. I
[hereinafter Economist Survey] (explaining that United Kingdom's capital markets are preem-
inent in Europe).
23. See Note, Insider Trading and the Internationalization of the Securities Markets, 27
CoLurm. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 409, 415-17 (1989) (discussing deregulation and globalization of
international securities markets); Economist Survey, supra note 22, at 5-9 (noting strong push
for deregulation and competition among European countries); Ruder Says Commission Should
Oppose Expansion of Non-Shareholder Rights, [July-Dec.] See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No.
39, at 1504, 1507-08 (Oct. 6, 1989) [hereinafter Ruder Interview] (stating that many foreign
countries have approached SEC for information about SEC's regulatory policies).
24. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty] (establishing European Economic Community or Eur-
opean Community (the EEC, the EC, or the Community), which represents group of European
countries that have agreed to achieve single market for Member States' goods and services).
The goal of a single common market free of obstacles to movement of persons, services, and
capital and the expected increase in the Member States' standard of living provided the
rationale for the creation of the European Economic Community in 1957. Id. art. 3. Belgium,
the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands founded the
Community in 1957. See Thieffry, Van Doom, & Lowe, The Single European Market: A
Practitioner's Guide to 1992, 12 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. RPv. 357, 357 n.3 (1989) (listing entry
of Member States into Community). The United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland joined the
Community in 1973, followed by Greece in 1981, and Portugal and Spain in 1986. Id.
25. See Single European Act, Feb. 17, 1986, 29 O.J. Eur. CoMM. (No. L 169) 1
[hereinafter SEA] (modifying EEC Treaty to allow for majority voting under certain circum-
stances, rather than unanimous voting in decisions by Member States); A. WnmR, R. SLOAN,
G. LEEINER, & V. Rum, EuRoPE WiTHOUT FRONTERS: A LAWYER'S GUIME (CORPORATE
PRAcTIcE SEaRIs) 9-22 (1989) [hereinafter A. WnirER] (providing historical background, ob-
jectives, and present status of SEA). While the Member States' initial efforts at achieving the
objectives of the EEC Treaty met with success, the rise of national interests and the requirement
for unanimous approval of all Community legislation soon stalled progress. Jones, Putting
'7992" in Perspective, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 463, 469-76 (1989). However, in February
1986 the Community adopted the SEA, which set December 31, 1992, as the first goal for
initial harmonization of Member States' laws in numerous areas. Id. at 472-73. Additionally,
under the SEA the Community modified the voting standard for passage of some Community
legislation from unanimous approval to a qualified majority. Id. at 473-74. As a result of the
SEA's amendments, harmonization of the Community's laws again is moving ahead quickly.
Id. at 474-76; see also Hoffman, The European Community and 1992, 68 FoREIoN Art. 27,
36-44 (1989) (outlining implications of 1992 harmonization process for Europe); Murphy,
European Political Cooperation After the Single European Act: The Future of Foreign Affairs
in the European Community, 12 B.C. INT'L & Com'. L. Ray. 335, 347-55 (1989) (same).
26. See NokL, WORKING TOGETHER: Tim INsTITTnONS OF THE EuROPEAN ComiuNrry 7
(1988) (discussing interplay and organization of Community's legislative process). The European
Commission (the Commission) initiates and drafts proposed legislation. Id. The Commission
then forwards the proposal to the Community's Council of Ministers, which after review
rejects, amends, or approves the proposal. Id. In most circumstances controversial legislation
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various proposals to regulate mergers and acquisitions. 27 The most recent is
the Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law concern-
ing takeover and other general bids (the proposed Directive), which estab-
lishes guidelines for the conduct of tender offers in a takeover attempt.
2
1
The objectives and underlying assumptions of the Commission's pro-
posed takeover Directive reveal some fundamental differences between the
regulatory philosophies prevailing in Europe and the United States.29 These
differences include the level of federal involvement in the enforcement of
regulations concerning the bid process,30 the regulatory agencies' balancing
also requires review and amendments from the European Parliament and the Community's
Economic and Social Committee before the Council of Ministers makes a final decision. Id.
The Council of Ministers can adopt four types of proposals: regulations, directives, decisions,
and recommendations. Id. A regulation is binding law and is legally enforceable against the
Member States and third parties without a need for implementing national legislation. Id. A
directive is binding law on the Member States as to the result achieved, but each Member
State exercises discretion over the Member States' own national implementing legislation. Id.
The Member States' national legislation cannot contradict a Directive's provisions, but can
include additional requirements. Id. A decision binds only the parties that submit a dispute to
Council for resolution. Id. A recommendation has no binding effect and is not a law. Id.;
see also A. WINTER, supra note 25, at 25-49 (outlining separate branches of Community
government and legislative process in general); Thieffry, Van Doom, & Lowe, supra note 24,
at 358 (outlining organization and procedures of Community's legal system).
27. See 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 60,125 (June 1989) (discussing directives that
Community has implemented under Article 54 of EEC Treaty to regulate mergers and
acquisitions). At present, the Council of Ministers has approved the following Directives as
part of the harmonization of Member States' company law: disclosure of share holdings, 31
O.J. Eut. Com. (No. L 348) 88 (1988) [hereinafter Disclosure Directive]; qualification of
auditors, 27 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 126) 20 (1984) [hereinafter Eighth Company Law
Directive]; 26 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 193) 1 (1983) [hereinafter Seventh Company Law
Directive]; requirements for spin-offs of divisions/subsidiaries, 25 O.J. Eum. Comm. (No. L
378) 47 (1982) [hereinafter Sixth Company Law Directive]; merger regulations, 21 O.J. EuR.
Comm. (No. L 295) 36 (1978) [hereinafter Third Company Law Directive]; requirements for
annual and consolidated accounts, 21 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 222) 11 (1978) [hereinafter
Fourth Company Law Directive]; minimum capital requirements, 20 O.J. EuR. Coimm. (No. L
26) 1 (1977) [hereinafter Second Company Law Directive]; disclosure of corporate accounts
and articles, 11 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 65) 8 (1968) [hereinafter First Company Law
Directive]. Basaldsia, supra note 22, at 488 n.6; see also A. WINTER, supra note 25, at 143-66
(reviewing all company law legislation in Community); Yates, European Directives on Formation
and Operation of Companies and the Role of the Lawyer, in HAImOmsmiAnox OF LAWS IN THE
EUROP.AN COMMuNrrsS: PRODUCTS LIABILTY, CoNFLIcT OF LAWS, AND COPRPOATION LAW
[FiFrrT SOKOL COLLOQUIUM] 113, 115 (P. Herzog ed. 1983) (describing intent and status of
company law legislation); Dine, The Community Company Law Harmonization Programme,
14 EUR. L. REv. 322, 323-328 (1989) (same).
28. Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law concerning takeover
and other general bids, COM (88) 823 final-SYN 186 (Feb. 16, 1989) [hereinafter Proposal
or proposed Directive]; Proposal, 22 BuLL. EuR. CommuNrras 5 (Supp. Mar. 1989).
29. See infra notes 188-222 and accompanying text (reviewing fundamental differences
between European Community and United States regarding regulation of takeovers).
30. See infra notes 189-98 and accompanying text (discussing centralized versus decen-
tralized control of takeovers).
1990]
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of shareholder autonomy and shareholder protection,3 and the type of
takeovers that the regulatory agencies authorize.
32
Comparison of the two systems will focus on tender offer regulation
because tender offers are the predominant method for acquiring control of
a corporation in a hostile fashion33 and because tender offers raise funda-
mental regulatory issues. 34 Overall, the European Community, in crafting
the proposed Directive, relies on essentially the same rationales and philos-
ophies toward hostile takeovers that the United States Congress used in
enacting federal regulations more than twenty years ago.
3 5
II. THE PROPOSED EUROPEAN TA.EOVER DnmCTIrE
The proposed Directive represents only one part of the Commission's
attempt to harmonize company law among the Member States and to
promote free movement of capital prior to 1993 . 6 In formulating the
31. See infra notes 200-11 and accompanying text (discussing balancing of shareholder
autonomy and shareholder protection).
32. See infra notes 212-22 and accompanying text (discussing role of speculative bids).
33. Johnson & Millon, supra note 11, at 1864 (noting that direct appeal by offeror of
financial premiums to shareholders is so effective that offerors rarely use proxy battles as
means to assume control of target company in United States).
34. A complete comparison of all regulations affecting mergers and acquisitions (including
antitrust and merger control issues) in the United States and in Europe is beyond the scope
of this note. See generally 1 EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL: LEGAL AND EcoNo)Ec ANALYSES
ON MULTiNATioNAL ENTERPRISES (K. Hopt ed. 1982) (summarizing antitrust policies for most
of European countries and for Community); A. WINTER, supra note 25, at 167-82 (reviewing
present structure of Community merger control laws); Fine, EC Merger Control in the 1990s:
An Overview of the Draft Regulation, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 513 (1989) (outlining draft
legislation regarding mergers in Community); Greenbaum, An American Perspective on the
European Commission's "Amended Proposals for a Council Regulation on the Control of
Concentrations Between Undertakings" and Its Impact on Hostile Tender Offers, 7 DIcK. J.
INT'L L. 195 (1989) (comparing draft legislation in Community for share disclosures with Hart-
Scott-Rodino Act and Williams Act in United States); MacLachlan & Mackesy, Acquisitions
of Companies in Europe-Practicability, Disclosure, and Regulation: An Overview, 23 INT'L
LAW. 373 (1989) (outlining present merger regulations in each Member State and at European
Community level); Vollmer, The EC's Three-Pronged Bid to Ease Cross-Border Deal Making,
1 J. Eui. Bus. 22 (1989) (outlining European legislation to encourage mergers in Community);
Europe's Single Market: At Last, a Merger Policy for Europe, Economist, Oct. 7, 1989, at
89, col. 1 (reviewing progress of Community in implementing merger policy); EC 'Victory' on
Merger Controls, Fin. Times, Jan. 4, 1990, at 7 (reviewing present status of Community's
merger policy); Getting Europe Ship-Shape to Compete in World Markets, Fin. Times, Feb.
8, 1989, at 32, col. 6 (same).
35. See infra notes 184-87 and accompanying text (reviewing similarities between Euro-
pean Commission's approach to regulating takeovers and United States' original takeover
control policies).
36. See Basaldfia, supra note 22, at 488 (explaining difference between mergers and
takeovers under proposed Directive); MacLachlan & Mackesy, supra note 34, at 398-400 (noting
likely expanded use of takeovers in Community over next several years); Vollmer, supra note
34, at 22-25, 40 (reviewing Community's legislative efforts to encourage standardization of
takeover controls); supra note 27 and accompanying text (outlining company law harmonization
program).
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proposed Directive, the Commission's underlying premise is that takeovers
and tender offers provide a constructive and positive outcome. 37 The Com-
mission believes that takeovers will aid the restructuring of European
industry, increase competition in the Community, and encourage European
corporations to grow to an internationally competitive size.38 In addition,
cross-border holdings of companies brings the Community closer together
and encourages European integration.3 9 By establishing uniform takeover
guidelines, the Commission seeks to encourage cross-border business com-
binations within the Community.40
Historically in the Community, only the United Kingdom has favored
such a free market philosophy toward the use of takeovers as a means of
fostering economic competitiveness. 41 In drafting the proposed Directive,
therefore, the Commission drew heavily from the City Code on Take-Overs
and Mergers (the City Code),42 which regulates takeovers in the United
Kingdom. 43 The primary difference between the proposed Directive and the
City Code is that the proposed Directive imposes legal, rather than informal
duties on all parties to the takeover bid.44 Because the Commission decided
to issue the takeover regulations as a directive, each of the Member States
will have to enact enabling legislation that complies with the Commission's
37. See Basaldtia, supra note 22, at 495 (contending that standardization of takeover
regulations within Community will play important role in assisting restructuring of European
industry).
38. See id. (explaining that preparation for 1992 will lead to use of takeovers by European
corporations); Karmel, supra note 12, at 79 (noting that harmonization of company law should
promote investment within Community); 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH), supra note 27,
60,125 (noting role proposed Directive will play in streamlining European industry).
39. See Vollmer, supra note 34, at 22 (emphasizing Community's interest in encouraging
cross-border deals).
40. See id. (explaining that Commission's legislation will encourage cross-border takeovers
and mergers).
41. See MacLachlan & Mackesy, supra note 34, at 383-86 (outlining United Kingdom's
preeminent experience with takeovers in Community).
42. THE CrrY CODE OF TAKE-OvERs AND MERGERS 1968 (revised Apr. 19, 1985) [here-
inafter the CrrY CODE]. The United Kingdom's Panel on Take-Overs and Mergers devised the
City Code in 1968 to regulate takeovers. See MacLachlan & Mackesy, supra note 34, at 386-
92 (outlining City Code's main provisions and objectives). The City Code consists of 10
principles and 37 rules, which impose voluntary duties on all parties regarding the proper
conduct of a takeover bid. Id. at 386 n.21. The City Code and the proposed Directive share
many common provisions and assume the same objectives of shareholder autonomy and equal
treatment of target company shareholders. Id. at 387-88.
43. See European Capital Markets: Implementation Proves to be Minefield, Fin. Times,
July 5, 1989, at 34, col. 4 (noting that Commission used City Code as basis for proposed
Directive).
44. See Last Post for the Panel, Economist, Oct. 7, 1989, at 89, col. 2 (noting that
implementation of proposed Directive jeopardizes United Kingdom Takeover Panel's informal
code); Alexander, Takeovers: The Right Way to Regulate the Market, Economist, Sept. 23,
1989, at 21, col. I (arguing against use of legal provisions by United Kingdom's government
in supervising takeover bids).
1990]
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original objectives. 4 As a result, Member State national laws will provide
the substantive takeover regulations, but the Member States will have to
satisfy the Commission's principles." In addition, the Commission will
require each Member State to create or empower supervisory agencies to
enforce the provisions of the proposed Directive.47 As a result of the
Commission's proposals, parties to future bids in the Community will have
recourse to the Member States' courts to contest the proposed Directive's
legal requirements. 4 The Commission, therefore, combines the introduction
of uniform minimum standards for takeover bids with flexibility in the
manner in which each Member State achieves the objectives of proper
oversight and enforcement: the result is harmonized rules with cooperative
enforcement efforts.
49
The proposed Directive imposes statutory duties of disclosure and
fairness on the offeror, target management, and the supervisory agencies.5 0
Under the proposed Directive the offeror, after deciding to make a tender
offer for a target corporation, publicly must disclose the offeror's intentions'
and distribute an offer document to the target's shareholders.12 Additionally,
45. See supra note 26 and accompanying text (reviewing process Community uses to
implement directives).
46. Id.
47. Proposal, supra note 28, art. 6, at 10-11; see also MacLachlan & Mackesy, supra
note 34, at 398 (contending that governmental body backed by legal rules more effectively
enforces takeover guidelines than voluntary code); infra notes 70-76 and accompanying text
(discussing role and organization of supervisory agencies under proposed Directive).
48. See Last Post for the Panel, Economist, Oct. 7, 1989, at 89, col. 2 (explaining that
United Kingdom companies can take tender offer disputes to courts); Lambert, Brussels Fights
for Accord on Takeover Bids, Fin. Times, Oct. 2, 1989, at 6, col. 1 (noting that bid parties
may litigate takeover Directive in national courts and that European Court of Justice Would
be court of last resort in such instances).
49. Vollmer, supra note 34, at 24-25.
50. See infra notes 51-76 and accompanying text (outlining duties that proposed Directive
imposes on offeror, target management, and supervisory agencies).
51. Proposal, supra note 28, art. 7, at 11. To reduce the involved parties' opportunity
for insider trading prior to publication of the bid terms, article seven of the proposed Directive
requires the offeror publicly to announce the offeror's intention to bid for the target corporation
once the offeror has decided to make a tender offer. Id.
52. Proposal, supra note 28, arts. 7, 10-11, at 11-15. Article seven of the proposed
Directive requires an offeror to prepare and distribute an offer document immediately following
the offeror's public announcement of the bid. Id. at 11. Additionally, article seven requires
the offeror to send the offer documents to the controlling supervisory agency and the target
corporation prior to public distribution. Id. at 12. Article 10 of the proposed Directive requires
that the offer document contain, at a minimum, the following information: identification of
the offeror and the target company (offeree); disclosure of the securities for which the offeror
plans to tender; the amount of securities the offeror and those acting in concert with the
.offeror currently hold; the date of the purchase and price the offeror paid for the offeree's
shares; the consideration the offeror will pay for the offeree's shares and the basis for valuation
of any noncash securities the offeror will include as compensation for tendered shares;
guarantees of the offeror's ability to finance the cash portion of the bid; the final dates and
steps necessary for the offeree shareholders to comply with the offer's provisions regarding
acceptance of the tender offer; the offeror's intentions for the offeree company, including
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the proposed Directive requires the offeror to keep the offer open for at
least four weeks, but no more than ten weeks from the date of publication
of the offer document. 3 Under the proposed Directive, any revision in the
offeror's bid terms, whether by public dissemination of new terms or by
additional purchases of target shares on the open market at a price higher
than the offer price, extends the offer period one week from the date of
such action.14 Finally, the proposed Directive prohibits the offeror from
revising the bid during the last week of the offer period without the specific
approval of the supervisory agency.5 5 The proposed Directive also forbids
the offeror from withdrawing the offer without the approval of the super-
visory agency. 56 However, an unaffiliated third party's public announcement
of a separate offer for the target company automatically provides the original
offeror with a right to terminate the outstanding bid.
57
The offeror also has a legal duty under the proposed Directive to make
mandatory tender offers.A8 Under this provision if an offeror and any parties
acting in concert with the offeror purchase or control one-third of a
corporation's voting stock, the offeror must tender for 100 percent of the
plans for the addition of debt on the offeree, the sale of the offeree's assets, and the dismissal
of management and staff; any special agreements entered into between the offeror and offeree
management regarding the bid; and any other provisions the relevant supervisory agency
imposes on the offeror. Id. art. 10, at 12-14.
The offeror can distribute the offer document individually to each of the offeree's
shareholders or collectively through publication in one or more national newspapers. Id. art.
11, at 14-15. The Commission's intent in requiring the publication of offer documents was to
provide sufficient information for the target shareholders concerning the likely consequences
of the takeover. Basaldta, supra note 22, at 497-98.
53. Proposal, supra note 28, art. 12, at 15. This four to 10 week time period balances
the target shareholders' need to review all of the bid's material information with the undue
disruption of target management's control over operations during the bid period. Id.
54. Id., arts. 15-16, at 17-18.
55. Id., art. 15, at 17.
56. Id., art. 13, at 15-16. To reduce the chance that an offeror may attempt to manipulate
the target company's share price for speculative reasons, article 13 of the proposed Directive
provides that once an offeror distributes the offer document the offeror cannot withdraw the
bid except with the specific approval of the supervisory agency for cause. Id. The supervisory
agency will allow an offeror to withdraw its bid: if an unaffiliated third party makes a
competing bid; if the offeror fails to gain shareholder or stock exchange approval for the
issuance of shares or debentures necessary for payment of the tendered shares; if merger
authorities decide to reject the bid on antitrust or similar grounds; if the offeror falls to satisfy
any of the controlling supervisory agency's requirements or special conditions; and for reasons
of force majeure. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id., art. 4, at 9-10; see also Basaldfia, supra note 22, at 496 (noting that, to protect
shareholders from partial speculative bids, Commission included requirement that offeror make
1000o bid once offeror holds one-third interest in target). The Commission's denial of partial
bids above a 30qo interest protects shareholders who fall to tender shares to an offeror in a
partial bid from being placed in a minority position and having the value of their shareholding
decline substantially. Id.; see also infra note 72 and accompanying text (explaining that
supervisory agency can exempt offeror from mandatory bid when offeror passes legal threshold
accidentally).
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target's shares.5 9 The Commission seeks to avoid situations in which a party
has the ability to exercise control of a corporation without holding a majority
of the shares. 60 As a result, the proposed Directive eliminates the opportunity
for an offeror to make a partial bid for fifty-one percent of a target's
shares at a premium over market value and then buy out the minority
shareholders at a lower price in the future.6' Additionally, by requiring an
offeror to tender for 100 percent of the target's shares, the Commission
intends to limit bids by parties financially not capable of tendering for
complete control of the target.62 The requirement for mandatory tender
offers should help reduce offerors' use of coercive bids in the Community.
In addition to imposing duties on the offeror in a takeover bid, the
Commission places important constraints on target management's response
to a takeover bid.63 Under the proposed Directive, target management must
provide the target company's shareholders with an opinion of the bid,6
inform the target company's employees of the progress of the bid,6 and
make public any prior or current agreements between the offeror and target
management concerning the bid." More significantly, target management
cannot take any exceptional action67 to frustrate the bid unless target
management had decided to use such measures prior to the offer, or a
majority of the shareholders approve the measures at a general shareholders'
59. Proposal, supra note 28, art. 4, at 9-10.
60. See Basaldfia, supra note 22, at 496 (explaining that Commission attempted to limit
possibility of coercive bids).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See infra notes 64-69 and accompanying text (outlining duties that Commission placed
on target management).
64. Proposal, supra note 28, art. 14, at 16-17. Article 14 of the proposed Directive
requires target management to respond to an offeror's offer document in a report outlining
reasons why shareholders should accept or decline the bid. Id. If the takeover bid results from
a prior agreement between the offeror and offeree management, target management must
disclose the prior agreement to shareholders. Id. The supervisory agency will appoint an expert
to evaluate the offeror's consideration and to state whether the consideration is adequate. Id.
The proposed Directive requires target management to send management's opinion and the
expert's report to shareholders directly or to publish the information in one or more national
newspapers. Id. At all times, the target management's board of directors is under a duty to
act in the best interests of the offeree company. Id.
65. Id., art. 19, at 19-20. Article 19 mandates that target management keep its employees
informed about the bid and provide employees with copies of all documents concerning the
bid. Id. The Commission's requirements, however, do not allow employees to exercise inde-
pendent control over the success of the bid. Id.
66. Id., art. 14, at 17; see also supra note 64 and accompanying text (outlining require-
ment for shareholder notification of any agreement between offeror and target management
concerning bid).
67. See Proposal, supra note 28, art. 8, at 12 (noting that proposed Directive prohibits
"exceptional" actions by target management such as issuing new securities carrying voting
rights, selling substantial corporate assets, or carrying out other activities not in normal course
of company's business while bid is in progress).
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meeting during the offer period. 68 Thus the Commission seeks to ensure
that target management will act in the best interests of the company and
confine itself to the normal operations of the corporation.
6 9
To enforce the duties that the proposed Directive imposes on the offeror
and on target management, the Commission mandates that each Member
State create or authorize a national body to act as a supervisory agency for
takeover bids. 70 The supervisory agency will serve as the repository for all
information concerning the bid,7' will review requests for exemptions from
the rules,7 2 and will ensure that all parties comply with the proposed
Directive's provisions.7 3 In the event of a cross-border takeover bid, the
proposed Directive provides that the supervisory agency of the Member
State in which the target corporation maintains the corporation's registered
office will have final control over the conduct of the bid. 74 The proposed
Directive also requires that all third parties to the bid (nonofferor or
nonofferee) that acquire more than one percent of the target's shares have
a continuing duty to disclose the amount of their third party holdings to
68. Id., art. 8, at 12. Article eight of the proposed Directive prohibits target management
from taking any action to frustrate the bid while the offer remains open unless the target
decides on the defensive measures prior to the bid or succeeds in getting shareholders to
approve similar measures in a general shareholders' meeting during the bid. Id. The Commission
is expected to publish a future Directive concerning the types of defensive measures a target
company may use to thwart a takeover. Basaldda, supra note 22, at 500.
69. Proposal, supra note 28, art. 8, at 12.
70. Id., art. 6, at 10-11. Article six of the proposed Directive requires each Member
State to appoint a supervisory agency to monitor compliance by the parties with the Directive's
provisions. Id. The supervisory agency can be public or private, and can be a nationally or
regionally organized body. Id. The supervisory agency must have the authority to prohibit the
publication of an offer document until the offeror satisfies all disclosure requirements or to
require the offeror later to revise the bid document. Id.
71. Id., art. 17, at 19.
72. Id., arts. 4-5, at 9-10. Article four of the proposed Directive empowers the supervisory
agency to exempt a party that crosses the one-third shareholding threshold by mistake or by
accident (through inheritance or donation of shares) from having to make a mandatory
takeover offer for 100% of the target company's shares. Id. at 10. In addition, article five
allows the supervisory agency to determine whether to exempt an offeror from complying with
the Directive if the Fourth Company Law Directive classifies the target corporation as small
or medium-sized. Id. Under the Fourth Company Law Directive, a company is small or
medium-sized if the company fails to satisfy two of the following three criteria: a balance
sheet that exceeds 6.2 million ECU (European Currency Unit) (approximately $7 million); total
sales that exceed 12.8 million ECU (approximately $14.5 million); and a workforce that
averages 250 employees during the financial year. Fourth Company Law Directive, supra note
27, art. 27, at 21-22; see supra notes 52, 56, & 70 and accompanying text (reviewing supervisory
agency's ability to grant exemptions for change in bid time limits, bid withdrawals, and bid
revisions during last week of offer).
73. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (outlining powers of supervisory agency).
74. Proposal, supra note 28, art. 6, at 11. The proposed Directive will provide offerors
with greater certainty over which Member State will supervise the bid process and will reduce
substantially the chances of contradictory rulings by different Member States' supervisory
agencies during the bid period. See Vollmer, supra note 34, at 40 (contending that uniformity
of regulations will simplify offeror's procedural hurdles in making tender offer).
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the supervisory agency throughout the bid period.75 Thus the proposed
Directive insures that the supervisory agencies will have adequate informa-
tion from the involved parties at all times during the bid period.
7 6
While the Commission intended for the proposed Directive to provide
minimum uniform regulations for takeovers throughout the Community,
the Commission also granted each Member State the latitude to establish
additional requirements for the offeror and target management. 7 For ex-
ample, the proposed Directive allows the Member States to decide indepen-
dently whether to add a reciprocity provision, which could be used to
exclude takeover bids from parties located outside the Community.78 In
addition, the Commission provided each Member State with the discretion
to impose national takeover regulations that are more stringent than the
provisions of the proposed Directive.79 Thus the Commission structured the
proposed Directive with enough flexibility to encompass the Member States'
varying levels of experience with takeovers. 0
Although the Commission allows the Member States to enact comple-
mentary legislation that establishes additional requirements for the parties
to a bid, the proposed Directive forbids Member State provisions that
contradict the proposed Directive's objectives.8 ' Similarly, while the Member
75. Proposal, supra note 28, art. 17, at 19. Article 17 of the proposed Directive requires
all parties who hold more than one percent of the target company's shares to disclose the
amount of their holding and to report the date and price of any additional purchases by such
parties during the bid period. Id.
76. Id.
77. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing regulatory powers that Com-
mission gives Member States' supervisory agencies).
78. Proposal, supra note 28, at 5-6. One of the Commission's most difficult issues
concerned inclusion of a reciprocity clause in the proposed Directive. See Basaldda, supra note
22, at 499-500 (explaining use of reciprocity clause). Reciprocity allows a Member State to
prohibit a third country offeror from making takeover bids until that Member States'
corporations can make equivalent tender offers in the third country. Id. The Commission
decided to leave the question of reciprocity to the Member States individually rather than to
impose a blanket restriction in the Directive. Id. Thus, varying levels of access will be available
to non-Community offerors throughout the Community. Id. At present, because of strict
Japanese restrictions on the use of takeovers, imposition of reciprocity most dramatically
would affect access by Japanese corporations to the Community. See also A. WNTER, supra
note 25, at 75-85 (outlining concept of reciprocity in Community legislation and present uses
of provision).
79. See Proposal, supra note 28, art. 10, at 14 (noting that proposed Directive allows
Member States to require additional disclosure from offeror in offer document); Basaidda,
supra note 22, at 498 (same); Getting Europe Ship-Shape to Compete in World Markets, Fin.
Times, Feb. 8, 1989, at 32, col. 6 (same).
80. See Basaldfia, supra note 22, at 489-95 (reviewing Member States' experience with
takeover bids and discussing improvements that enactment of proposed Directive will make
possible). But see Greenbaum, Tender Offers in the European Community: The Playing Field
Shrinks, 22 VA.D. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 923, 932-33 (1989) (contending that Member States may
exploit flexibility of proposed Directive to enact stringent and mandatory tender offer require-
ments).
81. Proposal, supra note 28, art. 21, at 40-41. Article 21 of the proposed Directive
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States' supervisory agencies and national courts will make the majority of
decisions interpreting the proposed Directive's provisions, the Commission
and the Community's Court of Justice will retain ultimate control over
takeover policy at the Community level. s2 After final approval of the
proposed Directive, the Member States will have limited rights to object to
these Community bodies' enforcement of the proposed Directive's provisions
and subsequent takeover bid legislation. 3 The transfer of central coordi-
nation of takeover policy to the Commission by the Member States is one
part of the 1992 harmonization of laws program.8 4 The centralization of
control over bids in Community organizations also should provide offerors
with the advantage of consistent interpretations of takeover bid regulations
throughout the Community and, therefore, may result in a continuing
increase of Community-wide takeovers.85
Although the Commission limited the scope of the proposed Directive,
the Commission's effort is noteworthy in providing the first comprehensive,
common guidelines for tender offers among all of the Member States. 6 In
establishes a Community-wide committee that will be responsible for ensuring that the Member
States continue to apply the takeover regulations uniformly and in compliance with the proposed
Directive's provisions. Id.
82. See Policing Europe's Single Market, Economist, Jan. 20, 1990, at 69-70, col. I
(outlining process that Commission and Community's Court of Justice follow to ensure that
Member States' enabling legislation correctly implements Directive's provisions); Last Post for
Panel, Economist, Oct. 7, 1989, at 89, col. 2 (explaining United Kingdom's Takeover Panel
concern that proposed Directive will lead to extensive litigation on takeovers that Community
court may have to resolve); Brussels Fights for Accord on Takeover Bids, Fin. Times, Oct. 2,
1989, at 6, col. I (noting that statutory takeover regulations will allow involved parties to
litigate contested interpretations of proposed Directive in national and possibly Community
court and, therefore, will slow ability to complete takeovers); Europe's Rhetoric and Reality,
Economist, Sept. 23, 1989, at 64, col. 2 (reviewing Member States' ability to complete timely
implementation of Directives that Commission has approved previously).
83. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (discussing role of Commission in future
takeover legislation and enforcement).
84. See Vollmer, supra note 34, at 22 (emphasizing that central control of Community
organizations serves to promote uniform guidelines on takeover regulations).
85. See Basaldtia, supra note 22, at 495 (contending that proposed Directive will increase
offeror's ability to make takeovers in Member States which presently have had limited
experience with such transactions). Takeover activity in the Community has continued to
accelerate over the last several years and reached a record level of $55 billion (50 billion ECU)
in 1989. European Mergers and Acquisitions: Bidding Business, Economist, Jan. 20, 1990, at
96, col. 1. But see MacLachlan & Mackesy, supra note 34, at 374-83 (contending that European
takeovers are still hampered by lack of financial accounting disclosure, concentration of
corporate shareholdings in limited hands, and continuing differences among governmental
antitrust enforcement agencies).
86. See MacLachlan & Mackesy, supra note 34, at 398-99 (discussing varying level of
takeover legislation in Community). The United Kingdom has highly developed controls on
takeovers and tender offers because of the large number of mergers and acquisitions that
occur there. Id. Spain, France, and Portugal have enacted legal rules for takeover bids.
Basaldtia, supra note 22, at 489. Belgium and Luxembourg rely on common-law jurisprudence.
Id. Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom maintain voluntary codes of
conduct. Id. Tender offers are practically unknown in Denmark and Greece, which have no
relevant regulations. Id.
1990]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:663
addition, the Commission envisioned that the proposed Directive will become
the foundation for all'subsequent takeover regulations in the Community. 7
In drafting the proposed Directive, the Commission sought to ensure two
fundamental objectives: that shareholders have sufficient autonomy to decide
the outcome of a bid;8" and that all shareholders of the target corporation
receive equal treatment during the bid process.89 By imposing legal duties
on both the offeror and target management to disclose relevant information
regarding the bid terms, and by limiting the offeror's and target manage-
ment's use of coercive or defensive tactics, the Commission protects the
target shareholders' individual right to review the offer before the share-
holder reaches a decision. 90 While the Community is just beginning the
process of formulating regulatory controls over takeovers, the United States
has had over twenty years of experience with hostile acquisitions.92 The
United States' first attempts at takeover regulation shared many common
philosophies with the Commission's proposed Directive, but legislation over
the last decade has changed dramatically the original policies.
92
III. THE UNITED STATES' REGULATION OF TAKEOVERS
Until 1968 no statutory provisions existed in the United States regarding
the use of tender offers in takeover bids.93 Hostile takeovers still were fairly
novel events and most commentators generally were supportive of their
consequences. 4 However, federal and state legislators were concerned about
87. See Vollmer, supra note 34, at 22-23 (noting that Community is attempting to
simplify takeover procedures among Member States); Lambert, Brussels Fights for Accord on
Takeover Bids, Fin. Times, Oct. 2, 1989, at 6, col. 1 (outlining present status of proposed
Directive and discussing possibility that Commission will enact additional legislation to cover
more controversial aspects of takeovers); Getting Europe Ship-Shape to Compete in World
Markets, Fin. Times, Feb. 8, 1989, at 32, col. 6 (reviewing present status of Community's
merger policy).
88. Proposal, supra note 28, art. 10 & 11, at 12-15; see also Basaldda, supra note 22,
at 499 (commenting that Commission, in formulating Proposal, expressly sought to ensure
that target shareholders make final decision on bid's outcome). The proposed Directive places
a strong emphasis on shareholder autonomy in deciding the outcome of a bid. Id.
89. See Proposal, supra note 28, art. 3, at 8 (explaining in article commentary that equal
treatment of shareholders in same classes is fundamental principle of proposed Directive).
90. See 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH), supra note 27, 60,125 (explaining that, by
imposing legal duties on offeror and target management, Commission intended proposed
Directive to establish standards of full disclosure, equal treatment of shareholders, and equality
of opportunity).
91. See infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text (discussing history of United States
takeover regulations, which date from 1968).
92. See infra notes 184-87 and accompanying text (contending that European Commis-
sion's underlying philosophy and objectives in enacting proposed Directive bear similarities to
United States' takeover policies in 1960s and 1970s).
93. See infra note 96 and accompanying text (outlining passage of first federal and state
takeover regulations in 1968).
94. See Manne, Tender Offers & the Free Market, 2 MERGEs & AcQuisMoNs 91, 92-
93 (1966) (asserting that efficient capital markets will discount market value of corporation's
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an offeror's ability to purchase a large block of a company's shares on the
open market without any disclosure of such purchases to the target com-
pany's shareholders.9 5 As a result, first Virginia and then the United States
Congress passed legislation in 1968 requiring an offeror to comply with
certain statutory provisions when purchasing large blocks of another com-
pany's shares.
96
At the federal level, the United States Congress enacted the Williams
Act,97 which amended certain sections of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.98 In enacting the Williams Act, congressional legislators' main intent
was to provide the target corporation's shareholders with adequate time and
sufficient information about the offeror and the offeror's intentions to
enable those shareholders to reach an informed decision about the bid.99
The Williams Act's first provision requires any person or group that acquires
more than a five percent interest in another company's voting shares to
submit a disclosure report to the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
shares to reflect poor management and to allow takeover by more efficient management group);
Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. EcoN. 110, 113 (1965)
(asserting that merger threat serves as incentive for management to improve financial perform-
ance). Professor Manne provided the first effective rationale for the use of hostile takeovers
as a means to overturn entrenched management groups. See Johnson and Millon, supra note
11, at 1892-93 (discussing original rationales for takeover regulations). Manne asserted that
new management's post-takeover efficiency also would have a positive effect on the national
economy. Id. Some congressional legislators relied on Professor Manne's theories when initially
determining what level of tender offer controls to establish through the Williams Act. Id.
Other commentators have continued to expound Manne's theories regarding the benefits of
hostile takeovers. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HAxv. L. REv. 1161, 1165 (1981) (explaining that tender
offers provide positive benefits and that target management's role is not to block takeover
attempts unilaterally).
95. See Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 55 (2d Cir. 1985) (reviewing
takeover conditions prior to enactment of Williams Act); Johnson & Millon, supra note 11,
at 1893-97 (outlining regulatory "gap" in federal securities laws from parties purchasing large
blocks of company's shares without disclosure).
96. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e) & 78n(d)-(f) (1988) (enacting Williams Act, which
mandated tender offer disclosure provisions); 1968 VA. AcTs ch. 119, §§ 13.1-528 to 13.1-540
(establishing first state restrictions on takeovers and tender offers). Both state and federal
legislators were concerned with the dramatic increase in the use of tender offers. See H.R.
R P. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 4 (1968) (stating that purpose of Williams Act was to
fill regulatory "gap" in federal securities laws) reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2812 [hereinafter HousE REPORT]. In 1960 offerors in the United States made eight
tender offers, which totaled $186 million. Id. By 1966 offerors made over 100 tender offers,
which totaled over $1 billion. Id.
97. The Securities-Corporate Equity Ownership-Disclosure (Williams) Act, Pub. L. No.
90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e) & 78n(d)-(f)
(1988).
98. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-kk (1988).
99. See HousE RaPORT, supra note 96, at 2813 (stating that merits of takeovers were
unknown and, therefore, federal legislators sought to balance interests of offeror and target
management so that target shareholders would decide proper outcome).
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SEC) 0 0 within ten days of reaching the five percent threshold.10 The
disclosure report must state the identity of the offeror, 02 the identities of
all parties affiliated with the offeror, 03 the source and the amount of funds
the offeror will use to purchase the tendered shares, 04 and the number of
shares the offeror presently holds. 05 Additionally, the disclosure report must
state whether the purchase is for investment or for control of the target
company, 06 and, if for control, any plans by the offeror for the sale of
the acquired company's assets or for major changes in its operations. 0 7 The
disclosure report also must state whether the offeror has made any agree-
ments with third parties concerning the bid.'08
The second provision of the Williams Act requires any person or group
intending to make a tender offer for more than five percent of a company's
shares to file a disclosure report outlining the terms of the offer to the SEC
prior to the commencement of the bid. 0 9 Under the Williams Act, the
offeror must comply with all relevant filing requirements and must dissem-
inate the offer terms to shareholders within five days after publicly an-
nouncing a bid." 0 Additionally, the Act authorizes the SEC to invoke
sanctions ending the tender offer if the offeror falls to comply with the
Williams Act's requirements."'
After publication of the bid terms, the offeror must hold the tender
offer open for a minimum of twenty days." 2 However, each subsequent
100. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (1988) (establishing Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) as supervisory agency for federal securities law).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1988); Reg. 13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-l(a) (1989).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(A) (1988); Reg. 13D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-I to 240.13d-101
(1989).
103. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(A) (1988); Reg. 13D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1 to 240.13d-101
(1989).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(B) (1988); Reg. 13D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-I to 240.13d-101
(1989). The offeror must report any borrowings the offeror uses to finance the purchase of
the target company's shares. Id.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(D) (1988); Reg. 13D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1 to 240.13d-101
(1989). The Williams Act requires disclosure of the offeror's holdings and all those acting in
concert with the offeror of the target company's shares on an aggregate basis. Id.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l)(C) (1988); Reg. 13D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1 to 240.13d-101
(1989).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(C) (1988); Reg. 13D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1 to 240.13d-101
(1989). The Williams Act requires notification by the offeror if plans exist for the liquidation
of the target company, for sale of all the target's assets, or for any other major changes in
the target's operations. Id.
108. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(E) (1988); Reg. 13D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1 to 240.13d-101
(1989). All agreements between the offeror and other parties concerning the tender offer must
be disclosed. Id. These agreements include contracts, understandings, guaranties, options,
loans, and any other information indicating joint efforts by the parties. Id.
109. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1988); Reg. 14D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-1 to 240.14d-101
(1989).
110. Rule 14d-2(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b) (1989).
111. Rule 14d-3(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-3(a) (1989).
112. Rule 14e-l(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(a) (1989). The 20 day time limit under this rule
begins from the date the offeror publishes or sends the tender offer proposal to the target
shareholders. Id.
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revision of the bid terms by the offeror will extend the offer ten business
days from the date of the offeror's announcement of these revisions."'
After a target corporation's shareholder tenders shares to the offeror, the
Williams Act allows the shareholder to withdraw those tendered shares
during the first fifteen calendar days from the date on which the offeror
disseminates the bid terms." 4 Additionally, if the offeror has not completed
the bid, the shareholder may withdraw the tendered shares after the end of
sixty calendar days from the disseminating date."' In the event more
shareholders tender shares than the offeror has offered to purchase (over-
subscription of the offer), the Williams Act requires the offeror to purchase
a pro rata percentage of each shareholder's tendered shares.1 6 Finally, if
the offeror later increases the consideration to the target corporation's
shareholders, the Williams Act allows those shareholders that tendered shares
prior to the increase to receive the increased compensation.1
7
The Williams Act's third provision requires target management publicly
to set forth an opinion as to whether the target company's shareholders
should accept or reject the tender offer."" The fourth provision of the
Williams Act prohibits the offeror from using material misstatements,
misleading omissions, and fraudulent or manipulative acts in connection
with any tender offer." 9 The fifth and final provision of the Williams Act
requires the target company to disclose publicly any change of a majority
of the company's directors that the target company makes outside of general
shareholders' meetings following the offeror's purchase of more than five
percent of the company's shares. 20
The Williams Act's main emphasis is focused on ensuring that adequate
disclosure of information concerning a bid reaches the target company's
shareholders.' 2 ' The provisions of the Williams Act, coupled with the
antitrust concerns of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of
113. Rule 14e-l(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-l(b) (1989).
114. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1988); Rule 14d-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (1989).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1988); Rule 14d-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (1989).
116. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1988); Rule 14d-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1989). This provision
of the Williams Act ensures that the offeror treats all shareholders equally in partial tender
offers rather than allowing the offeror to choose between the parties that tendered shares
under the offer. Id.
117. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1988); Rule 14d-10(a)(2), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(a)(2) (1989).
This provision of the Williams Act also ensures that the offeror treats all target shareholders
equally. Id.
118. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4) (1988); Rule 14d-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9 (1989). Under the
Williams Act, the target company must state an opinion on the merits of the bid to target
shareholders. Id. Target management is allowed to distribute a "stop-look-and-listen" an-
nouncement asking shareholders to defer a decision on the tender offer until target management
can devise an opinion on the merits of the offer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-9(e) (1989).
119. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988); Rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1989).
120. Rule 14f-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14f-1 (1989).
121. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 11, at 1895-97 (noting that Williams Act's main
objective was to ensure disclosure of all relevant bid information to shareholders).
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1976,' 22 constitute the primary federal laws restricting takeovers and tender
offers.'13 Because of the perceived weakness of these federal statutes in
limiting abuses of the tender offer process, federal legislators have attempted
numerous times to amend key provisions of the Williams Act.' 24 Many of
the reform proposals attempted to shorten the Williams Act's reporting
limits or to provide clear definitions for some of the Williams Act's
important provisions.2 5 For example, the Williams Act does not define what
constitutes a "tender offer."' 26 In spite of the legislators' attempts, however,
122. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435,
as codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c-15h, 16, 18a (1988). The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improve-
ments Act requires notification by an offeror of a contemplated acquisition to the Premerger
Notification Department of the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the
Justice Department. Id. These governmental agencies then review possible anticompetitive
effects of the proposed combination. Id.; see also 1 M. LIPToN & E. STEINBERoER, supra note
1, § 7.01 (outlining provisions of Hart-Scott-Rodino Act and discussing implications on takeover
offers).
123. See Booth, The Problem With Federal Tender Offer Law, 77 CAiH. L. Rav. 707,
710-715 (1989) (noting importance of Williams Act in federal regulatory structure for takeover
controls); Brown, Regulatory Intervention in the Market for Corporate Control, 23 U.C. DAvIs
L. RiEv. 1, 5-11 (1989) (same); Greenbaum, supra note 34, at 196-204 (stating that Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act and Williams Act are primary federal takeover regulations). Congress also has
enacted legislation that limits acquisitions by foreign offerors of companies that may affect
"national security". See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
418, § 5021, 102 Stat. 1107, 1425-26 (1988) (providing legislative restrictions on tender offers
by foreign parties); Regulations Pertaining to Mergers, Acquisitions, and Takeovers by Foreign
Persons, 54 Fed. Reg. 29, 744-55 (1989) [hereinafter Exon-Florio Amendment] (same); Bello
& Holmer, Exon-Florio Regs Give President Authority to Block Takeovers, Nat'l L.J., Aug.
28, 1989, at 22, col. 2 (same); Greenbaum, supra note 80, at 951 (same).
124. See Lipton, supra note 4, at 59 (proposing federal legislation to limit use of coercive
offers); Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion, 57 U.
CiN. L. Rsv. 457, 470 (1988) (summarizing limitations of legislative proposals to amend
Williams Act).
125. See 1 M. LPToN & E. STEINBER ER, supra note 1, § 2.15 (outlining proposed changes
to Williams Act that SEC and Congress submitted over last 15 years).
126. See Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 56-57 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating
that Congress deliberately failed to define tender offer). Although the SEC and the federal
courts have offered suggestions for the definition of a "tender offer," Congress has not
accepted their proposals. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, for example, put forward an eight-part test to define "tender offer" in Wellman v.
Dickinson, 475 F, Supp. 783, 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 682 F.2d 355 (2d
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983). The eight factors include:
1) active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders for the shares of an
issuer;
2) solicitation made for a substantial percentage of the issuer's stock;
3) offer to purchase made at a premium over the prevailing market price;
4) terms of the offer are firm rather than negotiable;
5) offer contingent on the tender of a fixed number of shares, often subject to a
fixed maximum number to be purchased;
6) offer open only for a limited period of time;
7) offeree subjected to pressure to sell his stock;
[8)] public announcements of a purchasing program concerning the target company
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the Williams Act remains substantially unchanged from its original form. 27
Accordingly, parties intent on reform have turned to alternative forums to
introduce new regulations concerning the use of takeovers.
Because the Williams Act never attempted to protect the interests of
local communities from the effects of a takeover bid, state legislatures also
enacted statutes to limit possible abuses during the takeover process. 12 The
states' legislative efforts stemmed from concern that the absence of a clearly
defined federal merger policy encouraged a free market approach to cor-
porate takeovers that did not prohibit speculative transactions. 29 Conse-
quently, beginning with Virginia in 1968, state legislatures began to enact
legislation to prevent out-of-state parties from purchasing resident corpora-
tions and possibly disrupting established local business relationships. 1
30
Many of the first state statutes required the offeror to provide a pre-
bid notice to a state official, who then independently determined whether
the tender offer was adequate.' In Edgar v. MITE Corp.,32 however, the
Supreme Court held that state statutes requiring pre-bid notice conflicted
with the Williams Act and were unconstitutional.' At the time of the
precede or accompany rapid accumulation of large amounts of the target company's
securities.
Hanson Trust PLC, 774 F.2d at 56-57. This test, however, has not gained widespread support.
See Note, Defining "Tender Offer" Under the Williams Act, 53 BRooKLYN L. REv. 189, 203-
06 (1987) (reviewing attempts to provide statutory definition of "tender offer"). Similarly,
Congress has not accepted the SEC's proposed definitions of the term "tender offer." Id.
127. See Booth, supra note 123, at 738-48 (contending that Congress would best protect
shareholders' interests if Congress repealed Williams Act); Prentice, The Role of States in
Tender Offers: An Analysis of CTS, 1988 CoLTJm. Bus. L. REv. 1, 82 (explaining lack of past
amendment to Williams Act and discussing possible future amendment).
128. See infra notes 129-49 and accompanying text (reviewing history of state antitakeover
statutes).
129. See Booth, The Promise of State Takeover Statutes, 86 MicH. L. REv. 1635, 1666-
70 (1988) (noting reasons that states enacted antitakeover statutes following passage of Williams
Act); Booth, supra note 123, at 724-27 (stating that federal legislation does not prohibit partial,
two-tier tender offers that often apply coercive tactics to target shareholders); Lipton, supra
note 4, at 15-20 (noting types of abusive offers that federal rules do not prohibit); Prentice,
supra note 127, at 9-10 (explaining that states believed Williams Act required additional
provisions to protect state interests); Comment, State Takeover Legislation After CTS: Does
It Give States a Free Hand to Regulate Tender Offers?, 13 DEL. J. CoR'. L. 1029, 1034-36
(1988) (discussing state concerns over limit of federal regulation).
130. See 1 M. Lnpro1 & E. STE nBERGER, supra note 1, § 5.02[1] (explaining that states'
justifications for imposing state statutory restraints on tender offers resulted from fear that
takeovers would adversely affect local economies); Prentice, supra note 127, at 9-12 (outlining
states' original intent at limiting antitakeover activity).
131. See 3B H. Bx.oom hTHAL, supra note 7, § 13.34[1] (reviewing states' original antitake-
over provisions). Illinois was one of the first states to enact tender offer control legislation
requiring pre-bid notice. Id.
132. 457 U.S 624 (1982).
133. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982). In MITE the United States Supreme
Court considered whether the Illinois Business Take-Over Act (the Illinois Act) was unconsti-
tutional under the commerce clause of the Constitution or preempted by the Williams Act.
Id. at 630. The Illinois Act required an offeror to comply with the state's provisions if 10%
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MITE decision in 1982, thirty-seven state legislatures had enacted antitake-
over statutes that required pre-bid approval from a state agency. 3 4 As a
result of the MITE Court's decision, the states again were left unprotected
against hostile takeovers that complied with federal tender offer regulations.
Following the MITE decision, states developed alternative methods to
limit takeover activity that did not interfere directly with the Williams Act's
tender offer guidelines. For instance, to alter the ability of an offeror to
exercise control over the target company in the aftermath of a successful
tender offer, the states enacted control share acquisition acts (CSAs)35 and
business combination control acts (BCAs).136 The CSAs deny the offeror
the right to vote any newly acquired shares until the disinterested (nonofferor
and nonofferee management) target company shareholders approve the
transaction at a general shareholders' meeting. 37 Typically, if the offeror
fails to gain approval of the transaction at that meeting, target management
can repurchase the offeror's shares at the offeror's original purchase price
or can require the offeror to return the tendered shares to the original
shareholders.'38
of the target company's shareholders lived in Illinois, or if the target company satisfied at
least one of the following three residency conditions: maintaining its principal executive office
in the state, investing 10% or more of its total capital in the state, or incorporating in the
state. Id. If the target corporation satisfied any of these conditions, the Illinois Act required
the offeror to provide a 20 day notice of the offeror's impending bid to the Illinois Secretary
of State. Id. Either the Secretary of State or representatives of 10% of the target's shareholders
then could initiate a meeting to review the fairness of the offeror's bid before the offeror
could proceed with a public tender. Id. at 627. The Illinois Act imposed no time limit for
completion of such a meeting. Id. at 637.
MITE Corporation (MITE) refused to comply with the Illinois Act when MITE launched
a tender offer for an Illinois corporation that was subject to the Illinois Act's provisions. Id.
at 627-28. Instead, MITE sought to have the Illinois Act declared unconstitutional in federal
court. Id. at 629-30. The MITE Court held that the Illinois Act infringed on the rights of
out-of-state shareholders to receive MITE's tender offer. Id. at 643. The Illinois Act appeared
unreasonable to the MITE Court because, as drafted, the Illinois Act would allow the Illinois
Secretary of State to delay a bid even if the target corporation was incorporated in another
state and had no shareholders in Illinois. Id. at 643, 645-46. In addition, the MITE Court
held that the Williams Act provided shareholders with protection that was equivalent to the
protection under the Illinois Act. Id. at 645. Based on this review, the MITE Court found
that the Illinois Act's limitations on interstate commerce exceeded any benefits that the Illinois
Act provided to shareholders. Id. Accordingly, the MITE court held the Illinois Act uncon-
stitutional under the commerce clause. Id. at 647.
134. Id. at 631-32 n.6.
135. See 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEMnBERGER, supra note 1, § 5.03[1] (explaining that states
responded to MITE decision by enacting new types of state antitakeover statutes); 3B H.
BLooMETHr L, supra note 7, § 13.34[4] (discussing control share acquisition acts (CSAs)).
136. See 3B H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 7, § 13.3417] (discussing business combination
control acts (BCAs)). Bloomenthal refers to BCAs as Shareholder Protection Acts (SPAs). Id.
137. See Booth, supra note 129, at 1678-85 (discussing CSAs); supra note 135 and
accompanying text (same).
138. See 1 M. L'oTN & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 1, § 5.03[l][b] & 5.03[2] (reviewing
standard provisions that CSAs contain and discussing how provisions operate).
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In contrast, BCAs limit or forbid the offeror from selling the target
company's assets or from dramatically changing the company's operations
for a period of three to five years following a successful tender offer. 13 9
Exceptions to BCAs conditions are limited; for example, Delaware's statute
allows the offeror to assume control over the target company if target
management accepts the offeror's bid prior to the tender offer 14 or if the
offeror purchases eighty-five percent of the target corporation's outstanding
shares in one transaction. 41 Because CSAs and BCAs increase the offeror's
incentive to satisfy target management's conditions prior to the announce-
ment of the offer, CSAs and BCAs have encouraged "friendly" takeovers
and discouraged "bust-up" transactions. 42 The states, therefore, by limiting
the offeror's ability to exercise control over the target company following
a successful tender offer, effectively have reduced the number of hostile
takeovers of their resident corporations.
43
Although the MITE decision cast doubt on the right of the states to
enact antitakeover restrictions, 44 the Supreme Court in 1987 upheld the
constitutionality of Indiana's CSA provisions (the Indiana Act) in CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America.1 45 The CTS Court found that Indiana
had a valid right to control an acquirer's ability to vote the newly acquired
shares because its antitakeover legislation fell within the states' traditional
domain of corporate law powers. 46 Additionally, the CTS Court found that
139. See Booth, supra note 129, at 1675 (discussing BCAs); supra note 136 and accom-
panying text (same).
140. DEL. CODE Am. tit. 8, § 203(a)(1) (Supp. 1988).
141. Id., § 203(a)(2).
142. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 11, at 1874 (noting that BCAs require offerors
to approach target management to avoid triggering state statutory provisions); Pritchard, The
Case for the Constitutionality of State Business Combination Statutes, 13 DEL. J. CoR'. L.
953, 957-58 (1988) (noting that under New York's BCA, offeror must get approval of target
management to avoid triggering statutory provisions).
143. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 11, at 1874-75 (explaining that "bust-up" bids
become more difficult to execute in states that have approved antitakeover statutes).
144. See Note, State Regulation of Tender Offers: Legislating Within the Constitutional
Framework, 54 FoRDi.am L. Rav. 885, 889-97 (1986) (discussing constitutional reasons for
preemption of state law by federal statutes after MITE).
145. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
146. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987). In CTS the United
States Supreme Court considered whether the State of Indiana's statutory limits on the voting
rights of an offeror making a tender offer for an Indiana corporation are preempted by the
Williams Act or violate the commerce clause of the Constitution. Id. at 72. Indiana enacted
a corporate law (the Indiana Act) that denied voting rights to a successful acquirer of shares
in an "issuing public corporation" until disinterested (nonofferor and nonofferee management)
shareholders could meet and approve the transfer. Id. at 73-74. The Indiana Act defined an
issuing public corporation as requiring: incorporation in Indiana; 100 or more shareholders; a
principal place of business, a principal office, or substantial assets in Indiana; and either more
than 10% of the company's shareholders resident in Indiana, more than 10% of its shares
owned by Indiana residents, or a minimum of 10,000 shareholders resident in Indiana. Id. at
73. The acquirer automatically lost the right to vote the acquired shares at various shareholding
levels until disinterested shareholders approved the transaction at a general shareholders'
1990]
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neither the Williams Act nor the commerce clause of the Constitution had
any applicability to the Indiana Act.1 47 Following the CTS decision, many
states enacted antitakeover statues modeled after the Indiana Act. 48 At
present, a majority of states have enacted some type of antitakeover
legislation. 149
meeting. Id. at 73-74.
The CTS Court first found that, unlike the previous conflict in MITE, the Indiana Act
did not conflict with the Williams Act's provisions. Id. at 79-81. The CTS Court also found
that the Indiana Act protected shareholders from coercive bids because the shareholders
collectively would decide whether to grant an offeror voting rights to the offeror's newly-
acquired shares. Id. at 82-84. Because only a successful tender offer triggered the Indiana Act,
the CTS Court found that allowing the Williams Act to preempt state control over voting
rights would be an unlawful intrusion into a state's internal affairs. Id. at 85-87. The CTS
Court also reviewed the Indiana Act to determine whether the Act conflicted with the commerce
clause. Id. at 87. Because the Indiana Act only applied to corporations incorporated in Indiana
and treated all potential offerors for the corporation equivalently, the CTS Court found no
violation of the commerce clause. Id. at 87-93. Thus, the CTS Court held that the Indiana
Act was constitutional. Id. at 94.
147. Id. at 94. Commentators have written numerous law review articles about the CTS
decision. See generally Boyer, When It Comes to Hostile Tender Offers, Just Say No: Commerce
Clause and Corporation Law in CTS v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 57 U. CIN. L. Rnv. 539
(1988) (discussing implications of CTS decision on states); Buxbaum, supra note 14, at 29
(discussing possible constitutional implications for state corporate law following CTS decision);
Langevoort, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate Takeovers: A Comment on
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 101 HARv. L. Ray. 96 (1987) (discussing impli-
cations for state takeover statues following CTS decision); Pinto, The Constitution and the
Market for Corporate Control: State Take Over Statutes After CTS Corp., 29 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 699 (1988) (commenting that states have valid right to control traditional internal
affairs questions such as voting rights).
148. See Coffee, The Uncertain Case for Take Over Reform: An Essay on Stockholders,
Stakeholders & Bust-Ups, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 435, 458-465 (noting that passage of Delaware
takeover statute protects roughly 80% of total United States business capital from threat of
takeover); Millon, State Takeover Laws: A Rebirth of Corporation Law?, 45 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 903, 919-26 (1988) (noting that states have taken initiative on takeover laws following
CTS decision).
149. See States Enacting Takeover Laws Now Number 33, ABA Panel Told, [July-Dec.]
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at 1276 (Aug. 18, 1989) (reviewing passage of 33 state
antitakeover provisions). The states largely have chosen either to use CSAs, BCAs, or some
combination. Id. States adopting control share acquisition statutes include Arizona, Florida,
Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. See Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1211 to 10-1217
(1987) (defining CSA provisions); FiA. STAT. ANN. § 607.109 (West Supp. 1987) (same); HAw.
REV. STAT. §§ 415-71 to 415-74 (1985) (same); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1601 to 30-1614 (Supp. 1989)
(same); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42 (West 1989) (same); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-1286 to 17-
1298 (1988) (same); LA. Rv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:135 to 12:140.2 (West Supp. 1990) (same);
MD. Coaps. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-701 to 3-704 (Supp. 1989) (same); MAss. GEN. L. ANN.
ch. 11OD, §§ 1-8 (West 1990) (same); MICH. Comp. LAWS §§ 450.1790 to 450.1799 (1989)
(same); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.671 (West 1985 & Supp. 1990) (same); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 351.407 (Vernon Supp. 1990) (same); NEB. Ray. STAT. § 21-2439 (Supp. 1988) (same); NEv.
REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.3765 to 78.3793 (Michie 1988) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-9A-01
to 55-9A-09 (1990) (same); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.831 (Anderson 1985) (same); OKu.A.
1990] HOSTILE TAKEOVERS
For their antitakeover legislation to comply with the requirements the
Court stated in MITE, state legislatures have altered significantly some
traditional assumptions of state corporate law. These changes include a
shifting in control over the outcome of a bid from individual shareholders
to shareholders collectively 50 or, more commonly, to target management.'
5'
The state legislators' premise was that the antitakeover statutes redressed
the unequal balance in the negotiation of bid terms between individual
shareholders and the offeror and, therefore, acted to protect shareholders'
interests. 15 2 The state statutes protect target shareholders by empowering
target management to act as the representative of collective shareholder
interests when negotiating the bid terms with an offeror. 53 However, because
many states simultaneously expanded target management's fiduciary duties
to include representation of nonshareholder interests and the long-term
interest of the target corporation itself, target management can disregard
shareholders' interests and reject a bid without fear of subsequent litigation
STAT. tit. 18, §§ 1145-1156 (1988) (same); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 60.801 to 60.816 (1989) (same);
S.C. CODE REGS. §§ 33-11-102 to 33-11-103 (Supp. 1988) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-35-
101 to 48-35-113 (1988) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-6-1 to 61-6-12 (1988) (same); VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-728.1 to 13.1-728.9 (1989); (same) Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-18-102 to 17-18-401
(Supp. 1990) (same). States adopting business combination acts include Arizona, Connecticut,
Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1221 to 10-1223 (1987) (defining BCA provisions); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 33-374d to 33-374f (Supp. 1989) (same); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §203 (Supp.
1988) (same); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-1132 (Supp. 1989) (same); HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 415-81
to 415-172 (Supp. 1989) (same); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1701 to 30-1710 (Supp. 1989) (same); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 7.85 (Smith-Hurd 1987) (same); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-43 (West
1989) (same); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-12,100 to 17-12,104 (Supp. 1989) (same); KY. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 271A.396 to 271A.399 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1988) (same); MD. CoRPs. &
Ass'Ns CODE ANN. §§ 3-602 to 3-603 (Supp. 1989) (same); MAss. GEN. L. ANN. ch. IlOF,
§§ 1-4 (West 1990) (same); MICH. CoM. LAws §§ 450.1775 to 450.1784 (Supp. 1989) (same);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.673 (West Supp. 1989) (same); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 351.450 to
351.459 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1989) (same); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 21-2452 to 21-2453 (Supp.
1988) (same); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:1OA (West Supp. 1988) (same); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw
§ 912 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1989) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-9-01 to 55-9-05 (1990)
(same); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2551-2556 (1988) (same); S.C. CODE RIus. §§ 33-11-102 to 33-
11-103 (Supp. 1988) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-35-201 to 48-35-209 (1988) (same); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-716 to 13.1-723 (1989) (same); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 23A.08.425
(Supp. 1988) (same); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.726 (West Supp. 1988) (same); Wyo STAT. §§ 17-
16-101 to 17-16-1621 (1987 & Supp. 1990) (same).
150. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 11, at 1870-71 (explaining that CTS Court failed
to differentiate between ability of shareholders to decide tender offer individually and Indiana
Takeover Act's provision that required collective shareholder vote).
151. See Gilson, Just Say No to Whom?, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 121, 122-28 (1990)
(stating that management entrenchment appears to be primary motivation for target manage-
ment to deny takeover bid); Johnson & Millon, supra note 11, at 1876-78 (discussing how
BCAs shift control over takeover bid from shareholders to target management).
152. See Booth, supra note 129, at 1646-49 (noting that all tender offers are arguably
coercive and that shareholders may need management to serve as negotiating agent).
153. Id.
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for breach of a fiduciary duty. 15 4 Many of the state antitakeover statutes
have provided target management with absolute control over the success of
a tender offer. 155 Thus the fundamental objectives and implicit assumptions
regarding takeovers and tender offers in the United States now differ
significantly from legislators' original conceptions and from the current
orientation of the European Commission.
In evaluating the changes in takeover regulation that have occurred over
the last decade in the United States, the most prominent feature is the shift
toward decentralized control over takeover bids. 56 The federal statutory
provisions in the Williams Act largely address procedural issues involving
the disclosure of relevant bid information to shareholders and the establish-
ment of time limits for each step of the tender offer process.5 7 Substantive
law addressing the offeror's ability to control the assets of a target company
following a successful tender offer is now predominantly a state corporate
law issue. 58 While each state has taken a different approach to protect its
resident corporations and those corporations' relationships with the local
community, the result is the imposition of effective restrictions on hostile
takeovers. 159 Based on the CTS Court's reading of the commerce clause and
the Williams Act, the Supreme Court is unlikely to find these recent state
antitakeover statutes are unconstitutional. 60 In addition, the United States
154. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 11, at 1906-07 (noting that states' inclusion of
nonshareholder interests as valid part of management's fiduciary obligations expands scope of
business judgment rule to point that little legal recourse is available to target shareholders if
target management rejects bid); Karmel, supra note 12, at 68 (contending that target company's
ability to consider nonshareholder interests is likely to become legal fiction which results in
erosion of shareholder rights); Ex-SEC Member Urges Action to Protect Shareholder Rights
in Control Contests, [July-Dec.] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1494, 1495 (Oct. 6,
1989) (contending that state statutes result in making target directors accountable to no one);
Ruder Interview, supra note 23, at 1504, 1505 (stating that state statutes undermine essential
shareholder rights); infra note 165 and accompanying text (discussing nonshareholder interests).
155. See Fay, State Takeover Laws: Shareholder Protection, the Constitution, and the
Delaware Approach, 24 GONZ. L. REv. 249, 284-85 (1989) (noting that Delaware's BCA
specifically intends to allow management to control bid outcome and therefore violates MITE);
Johnson & Millon, supra note 11, at 1873-82 (reviewing how states' control over corporation's
internal voting affairs provides basis for states to install antitakeover provisions that largely
subvert federal securities law); Pritchard, supra note 142, at 973-75 (explaining that BCAs
place control over bid's outcome in management's hands).
156. See infra notes 157-62 and accompanying text (reviewing change in regulatory control
from federal to state level).
157. See supra notes 94-120 and accompanying text (outlining Williams Act's provisions
regarding disclosure of information and other requirements during tender offer); Note, SEC
Takeover Regulation Under the Williams Act, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 580, 583-87 (1987) (same).
158. See Kozyris, supra note 15, at 503 (noting that states now control takeover activity
in United States).
159. See Note, "May We Have the Last Dance?" States Take Aim at Corporate Raiders
and Crash the Predator's Ball, 45 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1059, 1073 (1988) (reviewing different
state statutory approaches to antitakeover provisions); supra note 149 and accompanying text
(outlining different states' antitakeover statutes).
160. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (holding that
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Congress has not given any serious indication that it wishes to enact new
legislation to preempt present state antitakeover statutes. 6 ' One explanation
for the legislative inertia at the federal level is that Congress always has
been uncertain about the presumed benefits of takeovers. 162 Until a clear
direction emerges at the federal level, the states will continue to play the
pivotal role in determining the amount of takeover activity in the United
States.
An additional change in United States takeover laws involves the shift
in the balance between shareholders and target management regarding
control over the outcome of a bid. 63 Congress' original intent in enacting
the Williams Act was to ensure shareholder participation in tender offer
decisions by balancing the offeror's and target management's ability to
influence the outcome of a tender offer.'/ However, some state antitakeover
statutes allow target managements to consider the effects of a takeover on
the long-term stability of the target corporation, the target corporation's
employees, local suppliers, and the local community. 165 Because the target
company's management usually has a sizeable vested interest in remaining
independent, target management often decides unilaterally to reject a bid.'66
states had valid right to address takeover regulation issues); Amanda Acquisition Corp. v.
Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 367 (same);
Pinto, supra note 147, at 779 (contending that Supreme Court has left resolution of takeover
control to federal and state legislatures); Prentice, supra note 127, at 41-63 (noting that courts
are unlikely to overturn state statutes following CTS); Pritchard, supra note 142, at 963-83
(same).
161. See Booth, supra note 129, at 1666-67 (contending that any future amendment of
federal securities law by Congress will not directly overturn state statutes, but will continue to
follow traditional disclosure-related issues); Romano, supra note 124, at 458-70 (same).
162. See Booth, supra note 129, at 1700-02 (concluding that Congress will not preempt
state regulation of acquirer's ability to control acquired company); Prentice, supra note 127,
at 86-89 (same); Herzel & Shepro, Takeovers Hit by U.S. State Laws, Fin. Times, May 11,
1989, at 21 (noting that Congress presently has no interest in ensuring free-market protection
of takeovers through amendment of federal law because of uncertainty over merits takeovers
provide). But see Kozyris, supra note 15, at 1161-66 (arguing that Congress should modify
federal law to allow free transferability of stock without constraint by state law).
163. See infra notes 164-69 and accompanying text (discussing states' use of antitakeover
statutes to place control over takeover bid's outcome in management's hands).
164. See Booth, supra note 123, at 710-713 (noting that congressional legislators' intent
was to balance interests of offeror and target management); Johnson & Millon, supra note
11, at 1883-84 (same).
165. See Johnson, Corporate Takeovers and Corporations: Who Are They For?, 43 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 781, 783 n. 11(1986) (discussing nonshareholder interests); Johnson & Millon,
supra note 11, at 1906-07 (stating that shift in state corporate law from protecting shareholder
interests to allowing management to consider nonshareholder issues represents dramatic de-
parture from orthodox principles of shareholder primacy); Karmel, supra note 12, at 67-68
(stating that over dozen states have enacted statutes that allow consideration of nonshareholder
interests).
166. See Ruder Interview, supra note 23, at 1504 (discussing SEC Chairman Ruder's view
that SEC should actively seek to reverse situation where management can use nonshareholder
interests as basis for decisionmaking because of fear that accountability to shareholders would
decline); supra notes 150-55 and accompanying text (discussing effect on shareholders from
change in management fiduciary duties).
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Under several state antitakeover statutes, target management can reject the
tender offer solely on the grounds of nonshareholder interests without
violating their fiduciary duties to shareholders.1 67 By empowering target
management to act as a negotiator for shareholders' interests with the
offeror on bid terms, these state antitakeover statutes reduce independent
shareholders' autonomy over the outcome of a bid under the guise of
shareholder protection from coercive offers. 16s Therefore, the state statutes'
protection of shareholders actually results in a significant decline in a
shareholder's autonomy and should be paralleled by a reduction in takeover
bids by offerors for corporations within that state. 169
The third and final shift in the United States' policies toward takeover
regulations concerns legislators' attitudes regarding the merits of takeovers. 70
Federal takeover laws never have attempted to control an offeror's objectives
in making a takeover attempt.' 7' Takeover regulations in the United States
do not discourage speculative acquisitions as long as the offeror is willing
to satisfy shareholders' procedural protections, to pay a sufficient premium
over market price for the target company's shares, and to wait for the asset
control time limit (under BCAs) to expire. 72 In addition, an offeror is under
no obligation to tender for any certain amount of shares in the target
company. 7 Both state and federal law in the United States allow an offeror
to tender for fifty-one percent of a company's shares as easily as 100
percent. 74 The impartial nature of the tender offer process regarding the
offeror's intentions reflects legislators' and courts' uncertainty over the
merits of takeovers. 75 However, states have structured antitakeover statutes
to reduce hostile transactions by forcing the offeror to pay a substantially
167. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 11, at 1876-78 (noting that management does not
have to heed requests or intentions of shareholders under some state antitakeover provisions).
168. See Booth, supra note 129, at 1643-59 (reviewing effects on shareholders of possible
coercive bids); Johnson & Millon, supra note 11, at 1873-82 (explaining that BCAs give
management autonomy to control bid outcome); Karmel, supra note 12, at 68 (same).
169. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 11, at 1878 (noting that offerors are less likely
to tender for corporations that state antitakeover provisions protect).
170. See infra notes 171-78 and accompanying text (reviewing legislators' concern over
merits of takeovers).
171. See Booth, supra note 123, at 724-27 (stating that federal securities laws do not
prohibit partial bids on coercive terms); Johnson & Millon, supra note 11, at 1895-97 (noting
that Williams Act's main objective was to ensure that offerors disclose all relevant bid
information to shareholders).
172. See Booth, supra note 129, at 1643-59 (discussing various types of coercive offers);
Lipton, supra note 4, at 11-20 (outlining various types of abusive takeover practices United
States law presently allows).
173. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (noting that United States federal and
state law allow offerors to make partial offers).
174. Id.
175. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 11, at 1907-09 (discussing change in legislators'
views on merits of takeovers); Herzel & Shepro, Another Step Backwards for U.S. Takeovers,
Fin. Times, Jun. 8, 1989, at 23 (reviewing post-CTS court decisions regarding preemption of
state statutes).
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higher premium for the target company to receive target management's
approval of the takeover17 6 and often by requiring the offeror to wait a
substantial time period before being able to take control of the target
company. 77 These state measures, therefore, discourage bidders that lack
the financial ability to pay the higher premium or to wait for the requisite
time period to expire. 78 Generally however, the United States' policies
remain neutral toward an offeror's motivations and continue to provide the
offeror with flexibility in structuring a tender offer.
IV. COMPARISON OF TAKEOVER REGULATIONS IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY AND THE UNITED STATES
The most important distinction in the approaches that the United States
and the European Community follow in regulating takeover bids is the
position of each system in the merger and acquisition life cycle. 179 Takeover
regulations in the United States have had over twenty years to evolve and
adapt to the increasing size and complexity of corporate acquisitions. 80
Consequently, the United States' present regulations attempt to protect a
set of interests different than those protected in the early stages of the
merger cycle during the 1960s.18 ' In comparison, the European Community
has not witnessed a great deal of takeover activity outside the United
Kingdom, and very few hostile tender offers. 8 2 Rather the Community is
in the early stages of the life cycle and is focusing on the fundamental issue
of providing uniform takeover guidelines that its Member States will ac-
cept.
83
Although the two systems' regulatory philosophies start from different
historical backgrounds and different positions in the merger life cycle, the
United States and the European Community share many assumptions re-
garding takeover bid controls. For example, both systems expressly agree
that takeover regulations should rely on enforcement by governmental
supervisory agencies applying a statutory system with judicial review.' 4
Additionally, both systems expressly agree that takeover regulations should
176. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 11, at 1873-82 (discussing methods state statutes
use to reduce hostile takeovers).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See Id. at 1909-13 (noting that life cycle for takeovers exists in United States and
that states modified laws to address changes in life cycle).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1897-1903 (stating that legislators' fundamental assumptions regarding proper
regulations over takeovers have changed dramatically over time).
182. See Basaldda, supra note 22, at 492 (commenting that large number of takeovers in
United Kingdom stem from open and developed nature of United Kingdom's capital market);
Economist Survey, supra note 22, at 10, col. 1 (explaining that United Kingdom's capital
markets are preeminent in Europe).
183. Basaldfia, supra note 22, at 495.
184. See Karmel, supra note 12, at 82 (noting similarity between proposed Directive and
Williams Act).
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protect target company shareholders from coercive offers,"'5 and should
allow federal and state concerns to play a role in determining which interests
the regulations will protect. 8 6 Finally, both systems implicitly agree that, if
properly regulated, takeovers can have a positive economic outcome.
8 7
However, fundamental differences in the objectives and underlying assump-
tions of tender offer control are apparent.
The first difference between takeover regulations in the United States
and the European Community concerns the amount of federal involvement
and control over the regulatory process.' Originally, in the United States,
federal securities laws provided the principal basis for regulation of tender
offers.1 9 The Williams Act imposed a national standard that bound all
parties in a tender offer to compliance with the Act's provisions.19° The
states, however, with the approval of the United States Supreme Court,
effectively usurped this federal authority through enactment of varying types
of antitakeover legislation.' 9' As a result, the United States has moved to a
system of decentralized control over takeover bids and has adopted legal
requirements that differ from state to state.' 92
In contrast, the Member States of the European Community appear
more willing to centralize control over takeover bids in Community-wide
185. See HousE REPORT, supra note 96, at 2813 (stating that Congress sought to reduce
chances for coercive tender offers); MacLachlan & Mackesy, supra note 34, at 387-88 (noting
basic premises of City Code, which Commission adopted in drafting proposed Directive).
186. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 86-87 (1987) (holding
that states had valid right to address takeover regulation issues); Amanda Acquisition Corp.
v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 502-05 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 367
(same); Proposal, supra note 28, art. 10, at 14 (stating that Member States will share regulatory
enforcement duties with Commission).
187. See Vollmer, supra note 34, at 22 (emphasizing Community's interest in encouraging
cross-border deals); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 94, at 1165 (contending that takeovers
serve useful economic purpose in United States).
188. See infra notes 189-98 and accompanying text (reviewing approaches United States
and European Community take on question of centralized bid control).
189. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 11, at 1869-70 (contending that MITE Court
strongly endorsed view that federal securities laws on takeovers preempted state statutes);
Herzel & Shepro, supra note 175, at 23 (same).
190. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 11, at 1895-96 (noting that federal legislators
enacted Williams Act to impose uniform national standards of disclosure of tender offer
terms).
191. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 86-87 (1987) (holding
that Indiana's CSA was within constitutional limits that states maintain over resident corpo-
rations' voting procedures). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
recently held that Wisconsin's BCA provisions also satisfy constitutional requirements. Amanda
Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 502-05 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 367. The United States Supreme Court's refusal to review the Wisconsin takeover
statute surprised many pro-takeover commentators. See High Court Refuses to Review Con-
stitutionality of Wis. Takeover Act, [July-Dec.] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at 1672
(Nov. 10, 1989) (reviewing Supreme Court's refusal to hear appeal on Wisconsin's takeover
laws); Herzel & Shepro, supra note 175, at 23 (reviewing Seventh Circuit's holding in Amanda).
192. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (reviewing various state antitakeover
statutes).
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government agencies in an attempt to foster a standard approach for bid
procedures. 93 To achieve centralized control, the Member States ceded
authority over the formulation and ultimate enforcement of takeover pro-
visions to the European Commission and the Community's Court of Justice.'1'
The Commission drafted the proposed Directive with the intent of providing
uniform provisions for takeover bids throughout the Member States. 95 In
addition, the Commission likely will initiate the bulk of the Community's
subsequent takeover bid legislation, especially for fundamental guidelines
and principles. 196 Thus, the European Community is adopting the same type
of federally centered regulatory structure that the United States used orig-
inally.
The two systems' opposite approach to the question of centralized
control will affect the level of takeover activity. The European Community's
standardized bid regulations are simpler for potential offerors to comply
with than the patchwork regulatory system of federal and state regulations
in the United States. 97 Therefore, the trend toward decentralized control
over takeovers in the United States is a clear signal that the states want to
reduce takeover activity, while the opposite result is likely to occur in the
Community. 198
The United States' current emphasis on state control over takeovers
follows from the states' strong belief that federal regulations failed to take
account of a takeover's effect on nonshareholder interests. 99 The second
193. See Basaldda, supra note 22, at 495 (contending that standardization of takeover
regulations within Community will play important role in assisting restructuring of European
industry).
194. See Policing Europe's Single Market, Economist, Jan. 20, 1990, at 69-70, col. 1
(outlining process that Commission and Community's Court of Justice follow to ensure that
Member States' enabling legislation correctly implements Directive's provisions); Last Post for
Panel, Economist, Oct. 7, 1989, at 89, col. 2 (explaining United Kingdom's Takeover Panel
concern that proposed Directive will lead to extensive litigation on takeovers that Community
court may have to resolve); Europe's Rhetoric and Reality, Economist, Sept. 23, 1989, at 64,
col. 2 (reviewing Member States' ability to complete timely implementation of Ditectives that
Commission has approved previously).
195. See Vollmer, supra note 34, at 22-23 (noting that Community is attempting to
simplify takeover procedures among Member States).
196. See Lambert, Brussels Fights for Accord on Takeover Bids, Fin. Times, Oct. 2,
1989, at 6, col. 1 (noting that statutory takeover regulations will allow involved parties to
litigate contested interpretations of proposed Directive in national and possibly Community
court and, therefore, will slow ability to complete takeovers).
197. See supra notes 189-96 and accompanying text (comparing United States' and
European Community's approaches to centralized control over bids).
198. See Kozyris, supra note 15, at 503 (noting that states now control takeover activity
in United States); Basaldda, supra note 22, at 495 (explaining that preparation for 1992 will
lead to use of takeovers by European corporations); Karmel, supra note 12, at 79 (noting that
harmonization of company law should promote investment within Community); Almost Half
of Larger U.S. Companies Have Poison Pill Plans, Study Reports, [July-Dec.] Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at 1630-31 (Nov. 3, 1989) (noting that nearly half of all United States'
companies have taken active measures to avoid takeovers).
199. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 11, at 1862-67 (contending that state's main intent
in enacting antitakeover statutes is to protect nonshareholder interests).
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difference between the United States and the European Community on
takeover regulations involves the question of nonshareholder interests and
the amount of autonomy each system affords target shareholders in deciding
a tender offer. 2 Federal and state legislators in the United States originally
assumed that individual shareholders were the proper body to control the
outcome of a bid.20' As a result, federal securities laws adopted a policy of
neutrality between the offeror and target management and simply required
both parties to disclose the merits of the bid to target shareholders.
20 2
However, because tender offers provided target shareholders with an at-
tractive premium over the shares' original market value prior to the bid,
states found that shareholders were very likely to tender shares to an
offeror.20 3 While the target shareholders earned a large return from tendering
their shares, the states increasingly were concerned about the disruption that
takeovers caused in the target company's local community.2 Consequently,
the states enacted antitakeover legislation that empowered target manage-
ment to decide the outcome of a tender offer and simultaneously expanded
management's fiduciary duties to include consideration of nonshareholder
interests. 20 5 This shift in state legislation substantially has eroded sharehold-
ers' autonomy because the target company's management controls the bid's
outcome.
201
In contrast to the United States, shareholder primacy over the success
or failure of a bid was the Commission's principal assumption in drafting
200. See infra notes 201-11 and accompanying text (discussing United States' and European
Community's balancing of shareholder autonomy and shareholder protection).
201. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 11, at 1897-99 (contending that both federal and
state legislators emphasized shareholder autonomy in 1960s).
202. See id. at 1893-97 (stating that Congress' intent in enacting federal securities laws
was to adopt policy of neutrality toward takeovers).
203. See id. at 1864-66 (noting that shareholders likely will accept large premium provided
by offeror in takeover bid).
204. See 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 1, § 5.0211] (explaining that states'
justifications for imposing state statutory restraints on tender offers resulted from fear that
takeovers would adversely affect local economies); Prentice, supra note 127, at 9-12 (outlining
states' original intent at limiting antitakeover activity).
205. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 11, at 1906-07 (noting that states' inclusion of
nonshareholder interests as valid part of management's fiduciary obligations expands scope of
business judgment rule to point that little legal recourse is available to target shareholders if
target management rejects bid); Karmel, supra note 12, at 68 (contending that target company's
ability to consider nonshareholder interests is likely to become legal fiction that results in
erosion of shareholder rights); Ex-SEC Member Urges Action to Protect Shareholder Rights
in Control Contests, [July-Dec.] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 39, at 1494, 1495 (Oct. 6,
1989) (contending that state statutes result in making target directors accountable to no one);
Ruder Interview, supra note 23, at 1504, 1505 (stating that state statutes undermine essential
shareholder rights); supra note 165 and accompanying text (discussing nonshareholder interests).
206. See Gilson, supra note 151, at 127-28 (contending that management entrenchment
appears to be primary motivation for target management to deny takeover bid); Karmel, supra
note 12, at 68 (stating that state statutes' expansion of company board's fiduciary responsibility
to include nonshareholder interests provides basis for board to disregard shareholders' rights).
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the proposed Directive. 2 7 In requiring the offeror and target management
to provide target shareholders with sufficient disclosure on the merits of
the bid, the Commission's proposed Directive follows the lead of the United
States' federal securities laws. 208 Significantly, the Commission also chose
to limit target management's role during a takeover bid to the supervision
of the company's normal operations. 209 Thus the proposed Directive does
not attempt directly to protect the nonshareholder interests of the target
company's local communities.210 Based on target shareholders' typically
positive view of tender offers, the European Community's emphasis on
individual shareholder autonomy likely will encourage takeover activity as
target shareholders capitalize on the premiums that bidders offer.
21
1
In addition to differences in shareholder autonomy, the United States
and the European Community take different views on the type of takeover
activity that each will permit. The United States never has made a concerted
effort at the federal level to restrict highly leveraged or coercive bids. 2 2 As
banks began to provide large loans for highly leveraged takeovers, offerors
in the United States were able to shift focus from acquiring companies
suffering from poor management to companies which were efficient and
well-run concerns. 213 Additionally, the United States' takeover regulations
allow offerors to take control of a company by tendering for less than the
full amount of a target's shares. 2 4 When an offeror tenders for less than
100 percent of a company's shares, the remaining minority shareholders
must choose to sell their shares to the offeror at less than the original
tender offer amount or litigate for a higher amount. 2 5 Recognizing that
partial tender offers are unfair to minority shareholders and that "bust-
207. See Basaldfia, supra note 22, at 499 (stating Commission's intent to ensure shareholder
autonomy through proposed Directive).
208. Proposal, supra note 28, art. 10, at 12-14; see also supra note 37 and accompanying
text (reviewing Commission's objectives in drafting proposed Directives).
209. See Basaldda, supra note 22, at 499 (discussing proposed Directive's limitations on
target management's ability to use defensive measures to thwart takeover bids).
210. See Karmel, supra note 12, at 75-77, 79-81, & 82-83 (noting that in United Kingdom
duty of target management and board still is primarily for shareholders and that while
Community legislation exists to expand fiduciary duties to include nonshareholder interests,
legislation has not made any progress toward enactment).
211. See Vollmer, supra note 34, at 22 (explaining that Commission's legislation will
encourage cross-border takeovers and mergers).
212. See Booth, supra note 129, at 1643-59 (discussing various types of coercive offers);
Lipton, supra note 4, at 11-20 (outlining various types of abusive takeover practices United
States law presently allows).
213. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 11, at 1908-09 (reviewing transfer of hostile
bidders' attention from poorly managed companies to well-run companies that offerors can
then "bust-up").
214. See Booth, supra note 123, at 724-27 (stating that federal securities laws never
forbade partial tender offers).
215. See 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINMERGER, supra note 1, § 1.08[1] (discussing two-tier,
partial tender offers).
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ups" endanger the target company's local communities, state statutes at-
tempt to ban all takeovers of state corporations.
216
In contrast, the European Community's proposed Directive requires that
if an offeror controls or seeks to tender for more than a one-third interest
in the target company, the offeror must tender for a full 100 percent holding
in the target company.217 Because this provision eliminates parties that lack
the funds to make an offer for all of a target company's shares and denies
the use of partial tenders, the proposed Directive encourages bids from
parties that have large financial resources and, therefore, are more likely
to be large industrial concerns making a long-term investment.218 However,
assuming that funds are available to an offeror, a target company in the
Community still may be subject to a hostile takeover as long as the offeror
satisfies the proposed Directive's requirements.
On the whole, the United States allows bidders much more flexibility
in designing tender offers, and supervisory agencies in the United States are
less likely to review the offeror's intentions if the offeror pays an adequate
premium to the target shareholders. 2 9 The United States' approach, there-
fore, is not to review the merits of a takeover independently, but only to
ensure that the offeror satisfies all legal obligations concerning the bid2 0
In contrast, the European Community is more interested in encouraging the
use of takeovers by parties able to provide sound long-term economic
justifications for the combination, rather than by those parties seeking
short-term financial gains. 22' The Community does not see takeovers as an
end in themselves, but as a means toward the restructuring of European
industry in a more efficient form.m
V. CONCLUSION
The European Community's approach to harmonizing Member States'
laws concerning the use of takeover bids bears many similarities to the
216. See Booth, supra note 129, at 1666-70 (1988) (noting reasons that states enacted
antitakeover statutes following passage of Williams Act); Booth, supra note 123, at 724-27
(stating that federal legislation does not prohibit partial, two-tier tender offers that often apply
coercive tactics to target shareholders); Lipton, supra note 4, at 15-20 (noting types of abusive
offers that federal rules do not prohibit); Prentice, supra note 127, at 9-10 (explaining that
states believed Williams Act required additional provisions to protect state interests).
217. Proposal, supra note 28, art. 4, at 9-10; see also Basaldtda, supra note 22, at 496
(noting that, to protect shareholders from partial speculative bids, Commission included
requirement that offeror make 100% bid once offeror holds one-third interest in target).
218. See Basaldfia, supra note 22, at 496 (explaining that Commission attempted to limit
possibility of coercive bids).
219. See Booth, supra note 129, at 1643-59 (noting that United States federal and state
law allow offerors to make partial offers); Lipton, supra note 4, at 11-20 (same).
220. See supra note 219 and accompanying text (discussing use of partial bids in United
States).
221. See Basaldfia, supra note 22, at 495 (contending that standardization of takeover




approach Congress took in drafting federal securities laws in 19 6 8.2 An
emphasis on adequate disclosure to shareholders by both the offeror and
target management, the adoption of regulations that attempt to balance the
interests of the offeror and target management, and the premise that
individual shareholder autonomy should be of primary concern are common
to both federal systems.22 In the United States, the initial consensus toward
regulation of takeovers broke down as states realized that hostile tender
offers affected local nonshareholder interests that federal regulations failed
to protect. 22 The states quickly reacted by enacting statutes that will lead
to a reduction in hostile takeovers.? In this respect, the United States has
passed from a free market philosophy regarding takeovers to a policy of
more active controls over the type of transactions that government super-
visory agencies will allow.2 7
In contrast, the European Community's enactment of the proposed
Directive and other company law legislation under its 1992 program should
provide fairly uniform regulations throughout the Community.28 While these
actions would appear to place the Community on the brink of a large
increase in takeover activity, the Commission has included provisions in the
proposed Directive to thwart the possibility of offerors making hostile and
coercive bids.Y9 Based on additional legislation pending in the Community,
the possibility that takeovers will ever rise to the level of importance the
corporate world experienced in the United States during the 1980s appears
unlikely.20 However, the Community likely will witness an increase in
takeover bids over the coming decade.Y
As the Community advances on the merger and acquisition life cycle,
there is a strong possibility it will follow the United States' lead and act to
protect a different set of interests than just that of the individual shareholder
who receives a tender offer. Therefore, a policy of including consideration
of nonshareholder interests prior to allowing a takeover should also play a
greater role in the Community as bids increase.
V4YARD V COOKE, III
223. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text (outlining similarities between United
States and European Community regulation of takeovers).
224. Id.
225. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text (reviewing breakdown of consensus
on interests that regulatory agencies should protect in takeover bids).
226. Id.
227. See supra notes 157-62 and accompanying text (noting that states control substantive
law regarding takeovers and have sought to discourage such activity).
228. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (contending that European Community
wanted to create regulations that allow for cross-border acquisitions).
229. See supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text (reviewing proposed Directive's pro-
visions for protection of target shareholders).
230. See supra note 34 and accompanying text (outlining Community legislation concerning
merger control regulations).
231. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text (predicting some increase in Commun-
ity's takeover activity).
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